The EU is widely recognised as the pre-eminent regional organisation. It’s level of success and continuity is unparalleled by other regional bodies, which are slowly trying to catch up with the European powerhouse. For some organisations, the EU has provided a model of development which has been followed to a large extent, allowing for real integration to take place, such as in the African Union. However it is hardly a surprise that a lot of differing regional organisations have not used the EU model as one to follow, with most states heavily rejecting the EU’s supranationalism and impedance on a states own sovereignty. Economic integration is where other regional bodies have followed the EU as far as they dare, but politically and militarily other states have rarely been as forthright; therefore the EU model has only been followed so far as its economic benefits outweigh the bureaucracy that comes with it.
Economically, the EU’s model for success is loosely followed by most rival regional bodies. Some such as the South American Mercosur, have heavily implemented the EU regional model for economic success. Mercosur has created a full blown customs union between nearly all South American nations with the likes of Argentina and Brazil being fully fledged members, and other states such as Chile and Colombia being associate members (who still receive the benefits of tariff-less trade). The customs union like the EU’s own, allows for free intra-zone trade, has devised a common trade policy and applies a common external tariff on the import of non-Mercosur goods. The creation of the customs union has led to Mercosur trade being worth $3 trillion a year, with the IMF noting it as the 5th largest trade bloc economy in the world. Along with economic integration, Mercosur introduced a Common Market Council and a Common Market Group, which design the nature of Mercosur trade and oversee its implementation across sectors; much like the EU council of Ministers, and in part like the directorate-generals of the EU commission. Therefore it can be seen that the model of economic integration shown in the EU is largely adopted, and has shown much success in improving economic conditions.
Yet, the EU’s model has not been truly replicated in any regional organisations, with some saying that the EU model would not be appropriate. This is the case in south-east Asia, where ASEAN has rejected the EU model despite wanting to achieve broadly the same aims. On the surface, the creation of a single market within ASEAN and desires for a single currency seem in line with the development of the EU, yet ASEAN rejects the creation of a fiscal union or that of a pseudo political one, which infringes on the sovereignty of its members. The four freedoms present in the EU, are restricted in ASEAN, with a key stipulation being the free movement of skilled labour – not people. Furthermore, those inside ASEAN see the EU path and ASEAN being distinctly different and so require a different approach; ASEAN encompasses a landmass that is more water than land, which presents different challenges to trade than that of the single landmass which allows the EU to develop such frictionless trade. Additionally, the cultural divides and rivalries are much more evident in south-east Asia, according to Asian Investment Bank vice-President Stephen Groff who sees these issues as key reasons why “…it’s not an appropriate model and nor should it be an objective of the ASEAN countries to achieve the same level of integration that you see in Europe.” Therefore it can clearly been seen that some regional bodies such as ASEAN, reject the EU model as it cannot be universally applied and be expected to create the same outcome. For a lot of regional organisations, development of their own institutions and level of integration is a strictly personal task. In light of this, the EU model is a good success story, but cannot be wholly applied in other regional bodies economically, simply due to the supranational element, which requires a huge sacrifice of sovereignty before the fruits of their labour show. Therefore the EU model can be seen to be applied in other regional organisations to a limited extent.
Politically, this issue is even more pronounced as many members of regional bodies heavily reject the idea of losing real sovereignty to a higher power. However this is not the case within the African Union, which to a large extent has replicated the institutions of the EU, with states accepting outside jurisdiction in some areas. The African Union has progressed in the same way as the EU, developing as a body through the treaties of Abuja (1991) and Sirte (1999), which created many of the institutions that are representative of the EU. These established a Pan-African Parliament, which includes 265 elected representatives of the 55 member states, that debate African issues. Furthermore it created the Assembly of the African Union, where heads of state meet annually as well as a Commission, an Executive Council and a Court of Justice which rules on interpretations of AU treaties. These bodies are all modelled from the EU’s own institutional setup to try and further African integration and allow for economic ties to become tighter. Yet even whilst replicating the EU model, much reform is needed within the African Union to make its institutions truly effective. However, even the African Union has rejected full blown supranationalism, with the Court of Justice having no power over domestic affairs of the Unions members. Therefore it can be seen that the EU has been directly used as a model for integration in other bodies, but there is still a way to go before it is truly emulated in a different regional body.
For the vast majority of regional bodies, the EU’s level of political integration is too deep for other states to pallet, with most adhering to an intergovernmental structure to retain sovereignty. This is the case within the Arab League, who place the independence of its members above all else. The Arab League primarily focuses on defusing tensions and creating relationships between states and representing Arab issues. Councils meet to discuss different sectors such as transport and vote on decisions, with decisions only being binding to those that vote for them. There is no resemblance or desire to resemble the EU here, where many heads of state want to keep external influences at a minimum. Many leaders in the Arab League fear that the Arab nationalist sentiment may lead to a sharing of wealth on this basis between the richer and poorer majority Arab nations, which would be detrimental to some wealthier Arab states. Therefore it can be seen in some extreme cases that the EU model is rejected entirely, with its achievements being directly opposite to the goals of other regional bodies. Therefore the extent of the EU as a widely accepted model of political integration is limited.
Finally, in terms of security integration, the EU’s continued insistence on a common security and foreign policy has been followed to an even lesser extent by other regional bodies who continue to reject the supranational factor. The treaty of Lisbon which created the common and security policy, is much of the reason why the EU has not been used as a model for others; because it shows that for real security integration to work, political integration is a necessity. However some elements of the make-up of EU security are utilised, by others such as the Arab League. The League has created a joint peacekeeping force, which acts in a similar fashion to the EU peacekeeping force, being deployed in areas such as South Lebanon, Darfur and Somalia. This is somewhat following part of the EU model, but displays that the EU has not been widely viewed as a good example for security integration.
In opposition to the EU’s supranational structure, bodies like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation have based security integration on bilateral co-operation. The organisation takes a joint approach to military training, planning and information sharing to tackle terrorism and extremism. SCO have developed their depth of integration through the creation of the Regional Antiterrorism Structure in 2004, which has since foiled over 600 terrorist plots and extradited 500 terrorists. However the organisation rejects any form of common policy towards security, and mostly rely on cross-boarder co-operation to operate. This is especially the case when Russia and China are its two most prominent members, who arguably already have the ability to protect their borders without entering into a regional structure. Therefore it can be seen that the EU’s security and military integration has been widely rejected, with most security-based regional bodies only willing to collaborate, not enter into real integration with one another. Therefore it can be said that the EU model concerning security has been ignored to a large extent by other bodies.
In conclusion, it can be seen that the EU has provided a base model for other regional organisations to look to for inspiration and display a successful regional body. However in practice the EU’s model has been underutilised politically, economically and militarily due to one single factor that runs through all of them; supranationalism. Although new regional bodies see the success that can arise from pooling their sovereignty, they are unwilling to give this up for fear of being subject to the jurisdiction of a body which may not always rule in their favour. Therefore the EU model can be seen to be used to a small extent, with it being most utilised economically, where states are far more willing to begin to open its borders to freer trade and so catch up with the pre-eminent economies of the world, most notably the EU. Yet the EU is a unique case, where historical events necessitated the creation of a regional body to heal the wounds of a divided Europe, which is not the case for many other regional bodies; explaining why it cannot always be universally applied.
Politica Carnivora 